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they don't overproduce when we already 
have overproduction and to the consumer 
so he can consume more. We are well 
aware that we have created a lot of this 
mess with inflation, which had to be 
tamed. A non-market oriented agriculture 
policy has created additional distortions. 
We believe that income supports must be 
provided to the farmer, but at the same 
time we must get those prices down so 
they are competitive. 
Beryl W. Sprinkel 
Chairman 
President's Council of 
Economic Advisors 
Professor David Shulenburger: 
It is impossible for an economist to 
give an unequivocal estimation of the 
direction the economy will go because the 
economist is generally an expert only in 
economics. To be able to give une-
quivocal advice, the economist would not 
only have to understand the economic 
system thoroughly, but he would also 
have to understand the political system, 
the social system, and even the reproduc-
tive and meteorological system. 
Given the imponderables that must be 
weighed if one is to estimate the future 
course of the economy, my prediction for 
real GNP growth for next year is 3 
percent. That will be a slightly greater 
growth rate than we are currently experi-
encing. In order to make this prediction I 
make the following five assumptions: 
1. The dollar will drop an additional 10 
percent vis-a-vis foreign currencies. 
2. The Federal Reserve Board will keep 
the money tap wide open. Interest rates 
will continue their gradual decline. 
3. Congress will make modest progress 
in reducing the deficit. 
4. The savings rate will remain at less 
than 4 percent of GNP. 
5. The inflation rate will remain under 5 
percent. 
Let's take these assumptions one by one 
and discuss them. 
The dollar will drop by ten percent 
in 1986. The dollar has dropped by 17 
percent relative to a trade weighted bas-
ket of foreign currencies since February 
of 1985. The high dollar has caused a 
flood of imports into the economy and 
has severely restricted domestic produc-
tion. Imports during the last 18 months 
have increased at an annual rate of over 7 
percent. This has kept domestic industrial 
capacity usage down to 80 percent. His-
torically, during expansions industrial ca-
pacity in the United States is utilized to a 
90 percent level. We are far below that 
level. We are below that level primarily 
because the goods that we are buying are 
increasingly coming from foreign facto-
ries, not from domestic factories. As 
imports have picked up in the last 18 
months, we see that industrial capacity is 
falling. In August of 1984 industrial ca-
pacity utilization was at 82 percent, 2 
percent above the approximately 80 per-
cent percent right now. Continued life for 
this recovery depends upon domestic pro-
duction increasing. This will happen if, 
and only if, the flood of imports abates 
and export growth becomes positive. An 
additional ten percent drop is predicted 
for several reasons. The fundamentals in 
the economy that caused the dollar to rise 
have now changed. International interest 
rates among the industrial countries, with 
the exception of those in Japan and Ger-
many, are approaching or exceeding 
those in the United States. Flight toward 
high interest rates, which have charac-
terized our economy, has been primarily 
responsible for our high dollar, because 
foreign investors have sought to get into 
our capital markets. 
I strongly discount the argument that 
foreigners have moved into our markets 
because U.S. markets are politically 
more stable than those abroad. While I 
agree with this statement, none of us 
hunts absolute stability in seeking a place 
to put our money. There is much risk in 
the world and there is much return in the 
world. What has characterized the years 
during which our trade deficits have wid-
ened has been interest rates much higher 
than those in the rest of the world. 
The second factor that has changed is 
that the federal government, as part of the 
G5 group of countries, has taken meas-
ures to push down the dollar. First came 
the great dollar sell-off by the G5 govern-
ments, and now we are in a second stage 
where foreign governments are trying to 
restrict their money supply growth in 
order to raise their domestic interest 
rates. While intervention in markets gen-
erally is not lasting, this intervention 
occurred when the fundamentals were 
moving against the dollar and has contrib-
uted to its decline. 
Third, I predict an additional ten per-
cent drop rather than a greater drop 
because I believe the will to continue the 
political intervention will disappear as the 
dollar moves toward its 1980 levels. Do-
mestic high interest rates in Germany, 
Japan, England, and France will crimp 
their economies to such a degree that the 
gains which they receive from a lower 
dollar in terms of reduced capital outflow 
will be offset by losses from high interest 
rates. As the dollar moves back to its 
1980 levels, all intervention in the market 
will cease and stability will come. 
It is very important to the economy that 
the flow of imports be stopped. It is very 
tempting to stop this flow of imports by 
enacting quotas and tariffs in the Con-
gress. Indeed, Beryl Sprinkel of the 
Council of Economic Advisors now 
counts over 300 bills before Congress to 
do exactly this. Any person who has 
examined our trade practices will cer-
tainly conclude that our trade with Japan, 
Brazil, and India is unfair. However, they 
have the same set of barriers in effect that 
they had four years ago. What has 
changed in the last four years is that the 
U.S. government budget has moved mas-
sively into deficit, putting huge pressure 
on its credit markets and pushing interest 
rates above those of the rest of the world. 
With this rise in interest rates, the dollar 
went up, and the trade surplus disap-
peared. The change that occurred is not in 
the relative fairness of our trading part-
ners, but in our own attractiveness to 
foreign capital. To deal with this problem 
by enacting trade barriers should conjur 
up the ghost of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act. International trade can collapse to-
day as it did during the depression of the 
thirties if countries begin setting up com-
petitive barriers toward their neighbors. 
As domestic interest rates fall, so will the 
dollar. As it falls, imports will decline 
and exports will increase. 
The Federal Reserve will keep the 
money taps open. Over the past few 
months the U.S. M-l growth rate has 
averaged 15.9 percent. The money 
growth rate will continue at this high 
level. Inflation has not become a problem 
in our economy. I want to deal more with 
the reason for this later, but those who 
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study the Federal Reserve Board know 
that it has principally responded to infla-
tion in setting its policies. While we have 
anticipated increased growth in inflation, 
it has not yet developed and the Federal 
Reserve hasn't had to retard monetary 
growth. 
The- second reason that the Federal 
Reserve is likely to continue the growth 
rate of the money supply is that it is 
caught in a bind. It realizes that the 
United States has an overwhelming inter-
est in depressing the value of the dollar. 
As I discussed earlier, this reduction of 
value in the dollar is one of the few things 
that can get our industrial economy mov-
ing again. Our commitment with the G5 
group of nations is to reduce our domestic 
interest rates while they increase their 
domestic interest rates. The way to do so 
is to continue domestic money supply 
expansion. The Federal Reserve is more 
afraid of imports than inflation, and 
therefore rapid rates of money supply 
growth will continue at least until the 
point that inflation begins to rise rapidly. 
Congress will make modest progress 
in reducing the deficit. Primary evi-
dence of this is that our lawmakers have 
given such serious attention to the 
Gramm-Rudman amendment. It is clear 
that surrender of such great prerogatives 
to the unknown president who will suc-
ceed Ronald Reagan is an extreme thing 
for Congress to do. This represents 
strong evidence that Congress is con-
cerned about the deficit and is willing to 
take unprecedented (and perhaps unwise) 
measures in an effort to reduce it. 
I don't expect Congress to have a great 
deal of success' at significantly reducing 
the deficit. My best estimate is that within 
the next year and a half the deficit may be 
reduced to the $150 billion range. This is 
a far better level than where the deficit 
was heading. Projections of the deficit 
given recent rates of economic growth 
have it well over $300 billion in 1989. If 
we go from $300 billion to a $150 billion 
deficit, this is indeed progress. To dra-
matically reduce the deficit would be 
unwise. To withdraw from the economy 
so much purchasing power in such a short 
period of time would be enormously de-
stabilizing to the industries that have 
grown to depend upon it. Were Congress 
to dramatically decrease the deficit or to 
dramatically increase the deficit my pre-
diction for next year's GNP growth 
would certainly be lower than three per-
cent. 
Savings will remain at less than four 
percent of disposable income. Our post-
war savings rate is approximately seven 
percent. Our unprecedented low savings 
rate has been an enormous engine driving 
the economy. This means that three per-
cent more disposable income is chasing 
goods than we would normally expect. 
This additional money amounts to about 
$90 billion worth of consumption per 
year, which would not be accruing were it 
not for the abnormally low savings rate. 
Why predict that an abnormal occur-
rence like this low savings rate will con-
tinue? The primary reason is observation 
of the demographic structure of the econ-
omy. The decline in the savings rate from 
its historic 7 percent level began in 1974 
and is continuing today. In the period 
between 1974 and 1984, the 25-44 age-
group grew approximately 20 percent 
while the 45-64 age-group grew only 5 
percent. We could characterize 25-to-44-
year-old people as "spenders;'' 45-to-64-
year-old people as "savers." During 
their earliest years individuals generally 
are spending considerably beyond their 
means, buying houses, cars, raising fami-
lies, borrowing for college expenses. In-
deed the savings rate for many of the 25-
to-44-year-old age-group is negative. 
The older group, which we called the 
savers, are looking forward to retirement 
and saving money, and they also have few 
demands for large ticket items that 
haven't been met; their houses are pur-
chased. 
This demographic shift into the young 
group has continued. From 1980 to 1984, 
the 25 to 44 age-group grew by 10.3 
million people while the 45 to 64 age-
group shrank by 750 thousand people. 
Society saved less because there are 
fewer of us who are in the savings-prone 
years. This is likely to continue through 
1995 when the rate of growth in the older 
cohort equals the rate of growth in the 
younger cohort. This is definitely short-
term good news for the economy. We will 
be spending instead of saving. In the long 
term this either means that we will be 
unable to finance growth in our economy, 
or else that the financing of growth in our 
economy will have to come from foreign 
sources. 
The inflation rate will remain under 
five percent. It is currently bouncing 
around in the three to four percent range. 
Hence, my prediction allows for a two 
percent increase in the inflation rate 
through the end of 1986. The biggest 
change that will lead to additional infla-
tion is the decline in the trade-weighted 
dollar. Historically a 10 percent drop in 
the trade-weighted dollar has led to a one 
percent increase in inflation. The trade-
weighted dollar has already dropped 17 
percent since February. Rough calcula-
tions suggest about two percent more 
inflation due to this. But I don't believe a 
dollar lower by 10 percent will mean 
higher import prices by 10 percent, 
which would free domestic manufactur-
ers to raise their prices by 10 percent and 
be no worse off. The reason I don't 
predict this is that foreign producers have 
pretty healthy profit margins at the mo-
ment. They can afford to raise their 
prices by less than the decline in the value 
of the dollar and still have adequate profit 
margins. Domestic producers won't be 
free to raise prices as the dollar falls. 
In addition, another point I made,ear-
lier is important, manufacturing capacity 
is at 80 percent. We can place many more 
demands on domestic production capacity 
before we begin to run at capacity and to 
push up cost: Indeed, as the capacity rate 
approaches 90 percent we generally have 
increased inflation, so we've got a way to 
go-
We have made a great deal of progress 
in the last two years in reducing the most 
resistant source of inflation, that is infla-
tion in the services area. We have espe-
cially made progress in the difficult area 
of medical cost inflation. I suspect that 
most of the progress in reducing inflation 
in the services area is a result of deflation 
in the goods area in the economy. Goods 
producers who buy services like medical 
care have pressured their service produc-
ing brethren to hold the line on costs as a 
way of helping the goods producer sur-
vive. 
Wage costs in our economy are under 
much better control than they were a few 
years ago. Indeed, there is much evidence 
that a bit of a symbiotic relationship is 
developing between union and manage-
ment in this economy. Unions certainly 
have a realization today that strong do-
mestic firms are necessary if they are to 
continue to produce for their mem-
bership. Union wages are increasing at a 
slower rate than non-union wages. This 
has been the case Tor the last two years. 
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A major cause of our erratically higher 
rates of inflation in past years has been oil 
shocks. Oil shocks to the economy look 
exceedingly unlikely now. Indeed, the 
cartel of OPEC is essentially broken. 
Thus, what has been a source of severe 
inflation since 1974 appears to have been 
vanquished from the economy. 
Conclusion 
Moderate growth in the economy will 
continue. I see many ways in which this 
prediction can be stymied. The most 
probable cause of error in my forecast is 
the assumption about Congress. If Con-
gress makes no progress on the deficit 
and the deficit rises far beyond $200 
billion, call the forecast off and look for a 
real decline in the economy next year. 
The other major possible source of error 
in the forecast is my assumption about the 
Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Re-
serve is insulated more than perhaps is 
good for the economy from a political 
process. "Dumb" actions by the Federal 
Reserve Board to sharply limit the growth 
of the money supply could indeed bring a 
screeching halt to the growth of the econ-
omy. If I believed I were wrong about my 
initial assumptions, I wouldn't forecast a 
three percent growth rate. Being op-
timistic I will stand pat and forecast three 
percent real growth for 1986. 
David Shulenburger 
Associate Dean of the 
Business School 
University of Kansas 
The Kansas Economy 
After a strong period of growth during 
the 1970s the Kansas economy has shifted 
gears in the 1980s. The initial stagnation 
of the early 1980s was originally hoped to 
be a temporary phenomenon. However, 
as we move into 1986, the Kansas econ-
omy has shifted from leading the national 
economy to trailing it. As a prelude to the 
1986 forecast for Kansas, we will review 
the economic performance of Kansas 
throughout the 1980s. Then using this 
context as a basis for projecting the per-
formance of the Kansas economy, the 
staff forecast will be presented. 
Recent Kansas Economic 
Performance 
The 1970s were an excellent period for 
the Kansas economy. From 1971 through 
1979 the Kansas economy experienced 
nearly continuous growth despite the se-
vere national recession of 1974-1975. 
Not only was growth more consistent in 
Kansas than in the nation as a whole, but 
growth was also greater in Kansas. The 
economic performance of Kansas in the 
decade of the seventies can be attributed 
to the fortuitous tendency of the volatile 
sectors of the Kansas economy—agri-
culture, aircraft, and autos—to offset one 
another. The aircraft and auto industries' 
performance closely mirrors the national 
business cycle while the agricultural sec-
tor is more dependent upon international 
events determined more by climate and 
politics than economics.1 At no time in 
the 1970s were all three volatile sectors 
down at the same time. 
Compared to the 1970s, Kansas's eco-
nomic performance in the 1980s has been 
disappointing from two points of view. 
From 1971 to 1979, 270.8 thousand non-
agricultural wage and salary jobs were 
created in the Kansas economy.2 During 
that period, employment increased 40.1 
percent. From 1979 to 1985 only 35.2 
thousand nonagricultural wage and salary 
jobs were created, and employment in-
creased a meager 3.7 percent.3 Part of 
this decline in growth in the Kansas 
economy can be attributed to the national 
economy. The period 1980 to 1983 saw 
two recessions with the second being the 
worst post-World War II recession the 
United States has experienced. However, 
even taking this into account, Kansas 
performance has been disappointing. 
During the 1971 to 1979 period when 
Kansas employment grew 40.1 percent, 
U.S. employment grew 26.1 percent. 
Nonfarm jobs were being created at a 
much faster rate in Kansas than in the 
United States. This trend has reversed in 
the 1980s. From 1979 to 1985 employ-
ment in Kansas grew only 3.7 percent 
while in the United States it grew 8.3 
percent. 
The weak performance of the Kansas 
economy relative to the U.S. economy in 
the 1980s is illustrated in Figure l . 4 
Three distinct periods of economic activ-
ity can be seen in Figure 1: 1980-1981 is 
stagnation, 1982-1983 is decline, and 
1984-1985 is recovery. During each of 
these periods, the United States out-per-
formed Kansas. As Table 1 demonstrates, 
this statement can be extended to every 
year. Throughout the 1980s, the United 
States has always out-performed Kansas. 
A more detailed breakdown of the 
relative performances of the United 
States and Kansas economies is provided 
in Table 2. This table shows that employ-
ment in the nonagricultural sectors has, in 
almost every case, grown faster in the 
United States than in Kansas. The four 
sectors that had greater employment in-
creases or lesser employment declines in 
Kansas than in the nation were nondura-
ble goods (manufacturing), mining, fed-
eral government, and state and local 
government. The Kansas growth rate in 
the four sectors that grew the most in the 
nation was about two-thirds of the na-
tional growth rate. This is an indication 
that it is not the failure of one or two 
sectors in Kansas that has reversed the 
favorable trends of the 1970s, but rather 
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